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analyzing-packed-malware-with-upx-unpacker

Identifies and unpacks UPX-packed malware samples, including binaries with modified UPX magic bytes or headers that block automated decompression, to recover the original executable for static analysis. Use when a sample shows high entropy, minimal imports, or only LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress in its import table, or when preparing a packed binary for disassembly in Ghidra or IDA.

analyzing-packed-malware-with-upx-unpacker とは?

analyzing-packed-malware-with-upx-unpacker is a Claude Code agent skill that identifies and unpacks UPX-packed malware samples, including binaries with modified UPX magic bytes or headers that block automated decompression, to recover the original executable for static analysis. Use when a sample shows high entropy, minimal imports, or only LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress in its import table, or when preparing a packed binary for disassembly in Ghidra or IDA.

対応~Claude Code~Codex CLI~Cursor
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ドキュメント

Analyzing Packed Malware with UPX Unpacker

When to Use

  • Static analysis reveals high entropy sections and minimal imports indicating the binary is packed
  • PEiD, Detect It Easy, or PEStudio identifies UPX or another known packer
  • The import table contains only LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress (runtime import resolution typical of packed binaries)
  • You need to recover the original binary for proper disassembly and decompilation in Ghidra or IDA
  • Automated UPX decompression fails because the malware author modified UPX magic bytes or headers

Do not use when dealing with custom packers, VM-based protectors (Themida, VMProtect), or samples where dynamic unpacking via debugging is more appropriate.

Prerequisites

  • UPX (Ultimate Packer for eXecutables) installed (apt install upx-ucl or download from https://upx.github.io/)
  • Detect It Easy (DIE) for packer identification
  • Python 3.8+ with pefile library for manual header repair
  • x64dbg or x32dbg for manual unpacking when automated tools fail
  • PE-bear or CFF Explorer for PE header inspection and repair
  • Isolated analysis VM without network connectivity

Workflow

Step 1: Identify the Packer

Determine if the sample is packed and identify the packer:

# Check with Detect It Easy
diec suspect.exe

# Check with UPX (test without unpacking)
upx -t suspect.exe

# Python-based entropy and packer detection
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import pefile
import math

pe = pefile.PE("suspect.exe")

print("Section Analysis:")
for section in pe.sections:
    name = section.Name.decode().rstrip('\x00')
    entropy = section.get_entropy()
    raw = section.SizeOfRawData
    virtual = section.Misc_VirtualSize
    print(f"  {name:8s} Entropy: {entropy:.2f}  Raw: {raw:>8}  Virtual: {virtual:>8}")

# Check for UPX section names
section_names = [s.Name.decode().rstrip('\x00') for s in pe.sections]
if 'UPX0' in section_names or 'UPX1' in section_names:
    print("\n[!] UPX section names detected")
elif '.upx' in [s.lower() for s in section_names]:
    print("\n[!] UPX variant section names detected")

# Check import count (packed binaries have very few)
if hasattr(pe, 'DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT'):
    total_imports = sum(len(e.imports) for e in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT)
    print(f"\nTotal imports: {total_imports}")
    if total_imports < 10:
        print("[!] Very few imports - likely packed")
else:
    print("\n[!] No import directory - heavily packed")
PYEOF

Step 2: Attempt Standard UPX Decompression

Try the built-in UPX decompression:

# Standard UPX decompress
upx -d suspect.exe -o unpacked.exe

# If UPX fails with "not packed by UPX" error, the headers may be modified
# Verbose output for debugging
upx -d suspect.exe -o unpacked.exe -v 2>&1

# Verify the unpacked file
file unpacked.exe
diec unpacked.exe

Step 3: Repair Modified UPX Headers

If standard decompression fails, repair tampered magic bytes:

# Repair modified UPX headers
import struct

with open("suspect.exe", "rb") as f:
    data = bytearray(f.read())

# UPX magic bytes: "UPX!" (0x55505821)
# Malware authors commonly modify these to prevent automatic unpacking

# Search for modified UPX signatures
upx_magic = b"UPX!"
modified_patterns = [b"UPX0", b"UPX\x00", b"\x00PX!", b"UPx!"]

# Find and restore section names
pe_offset = struct.unpack_from("<I", data, 0x3C)[0]
num_sections = struct.unpack_from("<H", data, pe_offset + 6)[0]
section_table_offset = pe_offset + 0x18 + struct.unpack_from("<H", data, pe_offset + 0x14)[0]

print(f"PE offset: 0x{pe_offset:X}")
print(f"Number of sections: {num_sections}")
print(f"Section table offset: 0x{section_table_offset:X}")

for i in range(num_sections):
    offset = section_table_offset + (i * 40)
    name = data[offset:offset+8]
    print(f"Section {i}: {name}")

# Restore UPX magic bytes in the binary
# Search for the UPX header signature location (typically near the end of packed data)
for i in range(len(data) - 4):
    if data[i:i+3] == b"UPX" and data[i+3] != ord("!"):
        print(f"Found modified UPX magic at offset 0x{i:X}: {data[i:i+4]}")
        data[i:i+4] = b"UPX!"
        print(f"Restored to: UPX!")

# Also restore section names if modified
for i in range(num_sections):
    offset = section_table_offset + (i * 40)
    name = data[offset:offset+8].rstrip(b'\x00')
    if name in [b"UPX0", b"UPX1", b"UPX2"]:
        continue  # Already correct
    # Check for common modifications
    if name.startswith(b"UP") or name.startswith(b"ux"):
        original = f"UPX{i}".encode().ljust(8, b'\x00')
        data[offset:offset+8] = original
        print(f"Restored section name at 0x{offset:X} to {original}")

with open("suspect_fixed.exe", "wb") as f:
    f.write(data)

print("\nFixed file written. Retry: upx -d suspect_fixed.exe -o unpacked.exe")

Step 4: Manual Unpacking with Debugger

When automated unpacking fails entirely, use dynamic unpacking:

Manual UPX Unpacking with x64dbg:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. Load packed sample in x64dbg
2. Run to the entry point (system breakpoint then F9)
3. UPX unpacking stub pattern:
   a. PUSHAD (saves all registers)
   b. Decompression loop (processes packed sections)
   c. Resolves imports (LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress calls)
   d. POPAD (restores registers)
   e. JMP to OEP (original entry point)
4. Set hardware breakpoint on ESP after PUSHAD:
   - After PUSHAD, right-click ESP in registers -> Follow in Dump
   - Set hardware breakpoint on access at [ESP] address
   - Run (F9) - breaks at POPAD before JMP to OEP
5. Step forward (F7/F8) until you reach the JMP to OEP
6. At OEP: Use Scylla plugin to dump and fix imports:
   - Plugins -> Scylla -> OEP = current EIP
   - Click "IAT Autosearch" -> "Get Imports"
   - Click "Dump" to save unpacked binary
   - Click "Fix Dump" to repair import table

Step 5: Validate Unpacked Binary

Verify the unpacked sample is valid and complete:

# Verify unpacked PE is valid
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import pefile

pe = pefile.PE("unpacked.exe")

# Check sections are normal
print("Unpacked Section Analysis:")
for section in pe.sections:
    name = section.Name.decode().rstrip('\x00')
    entropy = section.get_entropy()
    print(f"  {name:8s} Entropy: {entropy:.2f}")

# Verify imports are resolved
print(f"\nImport count:")
if hasattr(pe, 'DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT'):
    for entry in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT:
        dll = entry.dll.decode()
        count = len(entry.imports)
        print(f"  {dll}: {count} functions")
    total = sum(len(e.imports) for e in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT)
    print(f"  Total: {total} imports")

# Compare file sizes
import os
packed_size = os.path.getsize("suspect.exe")
unpacked_size = os.path.getsize("unpacked.exe")
print(f"\nPacked:   {packed_size:>10} bytes")
print(f"Unpacked: {unpacked_size:>10} bytes")
print(f"Ratio:    {unpacked_size/packed_size:.1f}x")
PYEOF

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
PackingCompressing or encrypting executable code to reduce file size and hinder static analysis; the binary contains an unpacking stub that restores code at runtime
UPXUltimate Packer for eXecutables; open-source executable packer commonly abused by malware authors because it is free and effective
Original Entry Point (OEP)The real starting address of the malware code before packing; the unpacking stub decompresses code then jumps to the OEP
Import ReconstructionProcess of rebuilding the import address table after dumping an unpacked process from memory using tools like Scylla or ImpRec
PUSHAD/POPADx86 instructions that save/restore all general-purpose registers; UPX uses this pattern to preserve register state during unpacking
Section EntropyRandomness measure of PE section data; packed sections show entropy > 7.0 while normal code sections average 5.0-6.5
Magic BytesSignature bytes within a file identifying its format; UPX uses "UPX!" which malware authors modify to prevent automated decompression

Tools & Systems

  • UPX: Open-source executable packer with built-in decompression capability for properly packed files
  • Detect It Easy (DIE): Packer, compiler, and linker detection tool that identifies protection on PE, ELF, and Mach-O files
  • x64dbg/x32dbg: Open-source Windows debugger used for manual unpacking through dynamic execution and breakpoint-based OEP finding
  • Scylla: Import reconstruction tool integrated with x64dbg for rebuilding IAT after memory dumping
  • PE-bear: PE file viewer and editor for inspecting and repairing PE headers after unpacking

Common Scenarios

Scenario: Unpacking Malware with Modified UPX Headers

Context: A malware sample is identified as UPX-packed by section names (UPX0, UPX1) but upx -d fails with "CantUnpackException: header corrupted". The malware author modified the UPX magic bytes to prevent automated decompression.

Approach:

  1. Open the binary in a hex editor and search for the UPX header area (typically at the end of packed data)
  2. Identify the modified magic bytes (e.g., "UPX!" changed to "UPX\x00" or completely zeroed)
  3. Use the Python repair script to restore "UPX!" magic and correct section names
  4. Retry upx -d on the repaired binary
  5. If repair fails, fall back to manual unpacking with x64dbg (PUSHAD -> hardware BP on ESP -> POPAD -> JMP OEP)
  6. Validate the unpacked binary has proper imports and reasonable entropy values
  7. Import into Ghidra or IDA for full static analysis

Pitfalls:

  • Assuming UPX is the only packer; the binary may be double-packed (UPX + custom layer)
  • Modifying the original packed sample instead of working on a copy
  • Not reconstructing imports after manual memory dump (the dumped binary will crash without IAT fix)
  • Forgetting to check for overlay data appended after the UPX-packed PE sections

Output Format

UNPACKING ANALYSIS REPORT
===========================
Sample:           suspect.exe
SHA-256:          e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924...
Packer:           UPX 3.96 (modified headers)

PACKED BINARY
Sections:         UPX0 (entropy: 0.00) UPX1 (entropy: 7.89) .rsrc (entropy: 3.45)
Imports:          2 (kernel32.dll: LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress)
File Size:        98,304 bytes

UNPACKING METHOD
Method:           Header repair + UPX -d
Header Fix:       Restored UPX! magic at offset 0x1F000
Command:          upx -d suspect_fixed.exe -o unpacked.exe
Result:           SUCCESS

UNPACKED BINARY
Sections:         .text (entropy: 6.21) .rdata (entropy: 4.56) .data (entropy: 3.12) .rsrc (entropy: 3.45)
Imports:          147 (kernel32, user32, advapi32, wininet, ws2_32)
File Size:        245,760 bytes (2.5x expansion)
OEP:              0x00401000

VALIDATION
PE Valid:         Yes
Imports Resolved: Yes (147 functions across 8 DLLs)
Executable:       Yes (runs without crash in sandbox)

NEXT STEPS
- Import unpacked.exe into Ghidra for full disassembly
- Run YARA rules against unpacked binary
- Submit unpacked binary to VirusTotal for improved detection

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