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フィッシング対策のための証明書透明性分析

crt.sh と Certstream を使用して証明書透明性ログを監視し、フィッシングドメインを早期に検出します。

フィッシング対策のための証明書透明性分析 とは?

このスキルは、SSL/TLS証明書の公開ログ(Certificate Transparency, CT)を分析して、フィッシングに悪用される危険なドメインを早期に発見するためのツールとワークフローを提供します。crt.sh を使った過去の証明書履歴の問い合わせ、Certstream によるリアルタイム監視、類似ドメインやブランドキーワードに基づく疑わしい証明書の自動検出、そして脅威インテリジェンスレポートの生成を実装しています。主に Python 3.9+ 環境で動作し、情報セキュリティ担当者やSOCアナリストが、自社ドメインやブランドを狙ったフィッシングキャンペーンよりも先に、悪意ある証明書をブロックするために利用できます。各ステップはコード例付きで詳しく説明されており、カスタマイズも容易です。

対応~Claude Code~Codex CLI~Cursor
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/analyzing-certificate-transparency-for-phishing

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ドキュメント

フィッシング対策のための証明書透明性分析 は何をしますか?

概要

証明書透明性(Certificate Transparency、CT)は、発行されたすべての SSL/TLS 証明書の公開・追加専用ログを作成するインターネットセキュリティ標準です。CTログを監視することで、正規ブランドを模倣したフィッシングドメインの登録、自社ドメインに対する不正な証明書発行、証明書ベースの攻撃インフラを早期に検出できます。このスキルでは、crt.sh を介した CT ログのクエリ、Certstream によるリアルタイム監視、不審な証明書に対する自動アラートの構築、および調査結果を脅威インテリジェンスワークフローに統合する方法を網羅します。

使用すべきケース

  • フィッシングに関連するセキュリティインシデントの調査において、証明書透明性の分析が必要な場合
  • このドメインに関する検知ルールや脅威ハンティングクエリを構築する場合
  • SOCアナリストがこの分析タイプの構造化された手順を必要とする場合
  • 関連する攻撃手法に対するセキュリティ監視のカバレッジを検証する場合

前提条件

  • Python 3.9+ と requests、certstream、tldextract、Levenshtein ライブラリ
  • 過去の CT ログクエリのための crt.sh (https://crt.sh/) へのアクセス
  • リアルタイム監視のための Certstream (https://certstream.calidog.io/)
  • 監視対象の組織ドメインとブランドキーワードのリスト
  • SSL/TLS 証明書の構造と発行プロセスに関する理解

主要な概念

証明書透明性ログ

CTログは、暗号学的に保証され、公開監査可能な、TLS証明書発行の追加専用レコードです。主要な認証局(Let's Encrypt、DigiCert、Sectigo、Google Trust Services)は、発行したすべての証明書を複数のCTログに提出します。2025年時点で、Chrome と Safari はすべての公開信頼証明書に CT を必須としています。

CT によるフィッシング検出

攻撃者は類似ドメインを登録し、無料の証明書(しばしば Let's Encrypt から)を取得して、フィッシングサイトを HTTPS で正規に見せかけます。CT 監視は、証明書がフィッシングキャンペーンの開始前にログに現れるため、これらを早期に検出し、プロアクティブなブロックの機会を提供します。

crt.sh データベース

crt.sh は、Sectigo が運用する無料の Web インターフェースと PostgreSQL データベースで、CT ログをインデックス化しています。ワイルドカード検索 (%.example.com)、直接 SQL クエリ、JSON API レスポンスをサポートしています。すべての主要な CT ログにわたる証明書の発行、有効期限、失効を追跡します。

ワークフロー

ステップ1: crt.sh で証明書履歴を照会する

import requests
import json
from datetime import datetime
import tldextract

class CTLogMonitor:
    CRT_SH_URL = "https://crt.sh"

    def __init__(self, monitored_domains, brand_keywords):
        self.monitored_domains = monitored_domains
        self.brand_keywords = [k.lower() for k in brand_keywords]

    def query_crt_sh(self, domain, include_expired=False):
        """Query crt.sh for certificates matching a domain."""
        params = {
            "q": f"%.{domain}",
            "output": "json",
        }
        if not include_expired:
            params["exclude"] = "expired"

        resp = requests.get(self.CRT_SH_URL, params=params, timeout=30)
        if resp.status_code == 200:
            certs = resp.json()
            print(f"[+] crt.sh: {len(certs)} certificates for *.{domain}")
            return certs
        return []

    def find_suspicious_certs(self, domain):
        """Find certificates that may be phishing attempts."""
        certs = self.query_crt_sh(domain)
        suspicious = []

        for cert in certs:
            common_name = cert.get("common_name", "").lower()
            name_value = cert.get("name_value", "").lower()
            issuer = cert.get("issuer_name", "")
            not_before = cert.get("not_before", "")
            not_after = cert.get("not_after", "")

            # Check for exact domain matches (legitimate)
            extracted = tldextract.extract(common_name)
            cert_domain = f"{extracted.domain}.{extracted.suffix}"
            if cert_domain == domain:
                continue  # Legitimate certificate

            # Flag suspicious patterns
            flags = []
            if domain.replace(".", "") in common_name.replace(".", ""):
                flags.append("contains target domain string")
            if any(kw in common_name for kw in self.brand_keywords):
                flags.append("contains brand keyword")
            if "let's encrypt" in issuer.lower():
                flags.append("free CA (Let's Encrypt)")

            if flags:
                suspicious.append({
                    "common_name": cert.get("common_name", ""),
                    "name_value": cert.get("name_value", ""),
                    "issuer": issuer,
                    "not_before": not_before,
                    "not_after": not_after,
                    "serial": cert.get("serial_number", ""),
                    "flags": flags,
                    "crt_sh_id": cert.get("id", ""),
                    "crt_sh_url": f"https://crt.sh/?id={cert.get('id', '')}",
                })

        print(f"[+] Found {len(suspicious)} suspicious certificates")
        return suspicious

monitor = CTLogMonitor(
    monitored_domains=["mycompany.com", "mycompany.org"],
    brand_keywords=["mycompany", "mybrand", "myproduct"],
)
suspicious = monitor.find_suspicious_certs("mycompany.com")
for cert in suspicious[:5]:
    print(f"  [{cert['common_name']}] Flags: {cert['flags']}")

ステップ2: Certstream によるリアルタイム監視

import certstream
import Levenshtein
import re
from datetime import datetime

class CertstreamMonitor:
    def __init__(self, watched_domains, brand_keywords, similarity_threshold=0.8):
        self.watched_domains = [d.lower() for d in watched_domains]
        self.brand_keywords = [k.lower() for k in brand_keywords]
        self.threshold = similarity_threshold
        self.alerts = []

    def start_monitoring(self, max_alerts=100):
        """Start real-time CT log monitoring."""
        print("[*] Starting Certstream monitoring...")
        print(f"    Watching: {self.watched_domains}")
        print(f"    Keywords: {self.brand_keywords}")

        def callback(message, context):
            if message["message_type"] == "certificate_update":
                data = message["data"]
                leaf = data.get("leaf_cert", {})
                all_domains = leaf.get("all_domains", [])

                for domain in all_domains:
                    domain_lower = domain.lower().strip("*.")
                    if self._is_suspicious(domain_lower):
                        alert = {
                            "domain": domain,
                            "all_domains": all_domains,
                            "issuer": leaf.get("issuer", {}).get("O", ""),
                            "fingerprint": leaf.get("fingerprint", ""),
                            "not_before": leaf.get("not_before", ""),
                            "detected_at": datetime.now().isoformat(),
                            "reason": self._get_reason(domain_lower),
                        }
                        self.alerts.append(alert)
                        print(f"  [ALERT] {domain} - {alert['reason']}")

                        if len(self.alerts) >= max_alerts:
                            raise KeyboardInterrupt

        try:
            certstream.listen_for_events(callback, url="wss://certstream.calidog.io/")
        except KeyboardInterrupt:
            print(f"\n[+] Monitoring stopped. {len(self.alerts)} alerts collected.")
        return self.alerts

    def _is_suspicious(self, domain):
        """Check if domain is suspicious relative to watched domains."""
        for watched in self.watched_domains:
            # Exact keyword match
            watched_base = watched.split(".")[0]
            if watched_base in domain and domain != watched:
                return True

            # Levenshtein distance (typosquatting detection)
            domain_base = tldextract.extract(domain).domain
            similarity = Levenshtein.ratio(watched_base, domain_base)
            if similarity >= self.threshold and domain_base != watched_base:
                return True

        # Brand keyword match
        for keyword in self.brand_keywords:
            if keyword in domain:
                return True

        return False

    def _get_reason(self, domain):
        """Determine why domain was flagged."""
        reasons = []
        for watched in self.watched_domains:
            watched_base = watched.split(".")[0]
            if watched_base in domain:
                reasons.append(f"contains '{watched_base}'")
            domain_base = tldextract.extract(domain).domain
            similarity = Levenshtein.ratio(watched_base, domain_base)
            if similarity >= self.threshold and domain_base != watched_base:
                reasons.append(f"similar to '{watched}' ({similarity:.0%})")
        for kw in self.brand_keywords:
            if kw in domain:
                reasons.append(f"brand keyword '{kw}'")
        return "; ".join(reasons) if reasons else "unknown"

cs_monitor = CertstreamMonitor(
    watched_domains=["mycompany.com"],
    brand_keywords=["mycompany", "mybrand"],
    similarity_threshold=0.75,
)
alerts = cs_monitor.start_monitoring(max_alerts=50)

ステップ3: CTログからサブドメインを列挙する

def enumerate_subdomains_ct(domain):
    """Discover all subdomains from Certificate Transparency logs."""
    params = {"q": f"%.{domain}", "output": "json"}
    resp = requests.get("https://crt.sh", params=params, timeout=30)

    if resp.status_code != 200:
        return []

    certs = resp.json()
    subdomains = set()
    for cert in certs:
        name_value = cert.get("name_value", "")
        for name in name_value.split("\n"):
            name = name.strip().lower()
            if name.endswith(f".{domain}") or name == domain:
                name = name.lstrip("*.")
                subdomains.add(name)

    sorted_subs = sorted(subdomains)
    print(f"[+] CT subdomain enumeration for {domain}: {len(sorted_subs)} subdomains")
    return sorted_subs

subdomains = enumerate_subdomains_ct("example.com")
for sub in subdomains[:20]:
    print(f"  {sub}")

ステップ4: CTインテリジェンスレポートを生成する

def generate_ct_report(suspicious_certs, certstream_alerts, domain):
    report = f"""# Certificate Transparency Intelligence Report
## Target Domain: {domain}
## Generated: {datetime.now().isoformat()}

## Summary
- Suspicious certificates found: {len(suspicious_certs)}
- Real-time alerts triggered: {len(certstream_alerts)}

## Suspicious Certificates (crt.sh)
| Common Name | Issuer | Flags | crt.sh Link |
|------------|--------|-------|-------------|
"""
    for cert in suspicious_certs[:20]:
        flags = "; ".join(cert.get("flags", []))
        report += (f"| {cert['common_name']} | {cert['issuer'][:30]} "
                   f"| {flags} | [View]({cert['crt_sh_url']}) |\n")

    report += f"""
## Real-Time Certstream Alerts
| Domain | Issuer | Reason | Detected |
|--------|--------|--------|----------|
"""
    for alert in certstream_alerts[:20]:
        report += (f"| {alert['domain']} | {alert['issuer']} "
                   f"| {alert['reason']} | {alert['detected_at'][:19]} |\n")

    report += """
## Recommendations
1. Add flagged domains to DNS sinkhole / web proxy blocklist
2. Submit takedown requests for confirmed phishing domains
3. Monitor CT logs continuously for new certificate registrations
4. Implement CAA DNS records to restrict certificate issuance for your domains
5. Deploy DMARC to prevent email spoofing from lookalike domains
"""
    with open(f"ct_report_{domain.replace('.','_')}.md", "w") as f:
        f.write(report)
    print(f"[+] CT report saved")
    return report

generate_ct_report(suspicious, alerts if 'alerts' in dir() else [], "mycompany.com")

検証基準

  • crt.sh クエリが対象ドメインの証明書データを返すこと
  • 類似パターンに基づいて不審な証明書が識別されること
  • Certstream のリアルタイム監視が新しいフィッシング証明書を検出すること
  • サブドメイン列挙がCTログから包括的なリストを生成すること
  • 理由分類付きのアラートが生成されること
  • 実行可能な推奨事項を含むCTインテリジェンスレポートが作成されること

参考資料

Individual skills in this repo

This repo contains 20 individual skills — each has its own dedicated page.

abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access

Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket

abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc

Take over Active Directory accounts by writing attacker-controlled public keys to msDS-KeyCredentialLink (Shadow Credentials) with pyWhisker, Whisker, or Certipy, then authenticate via PKINIT to recover the target

achieving-cmmc-level-2-compliance

>-

acquiring-disk-image-with-dd-and-dcfldd

Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images with dd or dcfldd on a Linux forensic workstation, preserving evidence integrity through hash verification (MD5/SHA) during acquisition. Use when imaging a suspect drive, USB device, or memory card for investigation, preserving volatile disk evidence during incident response, or producing a verified copy for legal or law-enforcement proceedings before any destructive analysis.

analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse

Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3

analyzing-android-malware-with-apktool

Perform static analysis of Android APK malware using apktool for resource decompilation, jadx for Java source recovery, and androguard for manifest inspection, dangerous permission-combination detection, and identification of obfuscated code, dynamic code loading, and reflection-based API calls. Use to statically triage a suspicious APK without executing it or to build mobile malware detection rules.

analyzing-api-gateway-access-logs

Parses API Gateway access logs (AWS API Gateway, Kong, Nginx) to detect

analyzing-apt-group-with-mitre-navigator

Query ATT&CK data with attackcti, mitreattack-python, and stix2, then build MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layers and multi-layer heatmap overlays mapping one or more APT groups

analyzing-azure-activity-logs-for-threats

Queries Azure Monitor activity logs and sign-in logs via azure-monitor-query

analyzing-bootkit-and-rootkit-samples

Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware infecting the Master

analyzing-browser-forensics-with-hindsight

Parse Chromium-based browser databases with Hindsight to extract and correlate browsing history, downloads, cookies, cached content, autofill data, saved passwords, and extensions from Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, and Vivaldi into a unified timeline (XLSX, JSON, or SQLite output). Use during incident response, insider-threat investigations, or criminal cases when you need to reconstruct a user

analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence

Systematically evaluate cyber-campaign evidence to attribute an operation to a threat actor, using the Diamond Model and Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) to weigh infrastructure overlaps, TTP consistency, malware code similarity, and timing/language artifacts into confidence-weighted attribution assessments. Use when an incident investigation needs a defensible attribution confidence level.

analyzing-cloud-storage-access-patterns

Detect abnormal access in AWS S3, GCS, and Azure Blob Storage by analyzing CloudTrail Data Events, GCS audit logs, and Azure Storage Analytics for after-hours bulk downloads, new-IP access, and API-call spikes (e.g. GetObject) via statistical baselines and time-series anomaly detection. Use when investigating suspected cloud data exfiltration or building related detection rules.

analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration

Extract and analyze Cobalt Strike beacon configuration from PE files

analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles

Parse and analyze Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 profiles with dissect.cobaltstrike (profiles and beacon-payload configs) and pyMalleableC2 (AST parsing) to extract HTTP/DNS transforms, URIs, headers, sleep/jitter, and injection behavior, then generate network detection signatures. Use when reverse-engineering a captured malleable profile or building detections against Cobalt Strike Beacon traffic.

analyzing-command-and-control-communication

Analyzes malware C2 communication over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, and custom

analyzing-cyber-kill-chain

Analyzes intrusion activity against the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain

analyzing-disk-image-with-autopsy

Perform comprehensive forensic analysis of raw (dd), E01, or AFF disk images with Autopsy and The Sleuth Kit, recovering deleted files, examining metadata and embedded artifacts, keyword searching, and building investigation timelines with visual reports. Use for structured analysis of a forensic disk image or when stakeholders need visual reports from evidence.

analyzing-dns-logs-for-exfiltration

Analyzes DNS query logs to detect data exfiltration via DNS tunneling,

analyzing-docker-container-forensics

Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers,

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