MITRE ATT&CK skill
Baseline: ATT&CK v20.1 (v20 released 2026-10-13; v20.1 data patch modified 2026-11-05). Facts below were checked against live data on 2026-11-16. When the live site disagrees with this text (a newer ATT&CK release), trust the site. ATT&CK ships major releases in April and October plus smaller "Agile" releases (groups/software/campaigns) in between (first: v19.2, Aug 2026).
This edition looks everything up on attack.mitre.org with web fetch. It ships no scripts. For the offline CLI (bulk validation, coverage scoring, layer generation, release diffs) see the full plugin at https://github.com/THARAGESHWARAN-SATHYAMOORTHY/mitre-attack-skill.
Hard rules
- State the ATT&CK version (and domain) in every deliverable. Read it from the site (section 0).
- Verify every ID and name on the live site before output. Never quote IDs from memory. Fetch each object page once and reuse what you read.
- Never invent behavior. Every mapping cites evidence (quote, log line, report page). No evidence, no mapping; inference is marked Low confidence with the reason.
- Redact before output. Strip secrets, API keys, tokens, passwords, hashes of credentials, PII, salary data, and card numbers from any log, ticket, or connector data before it goes into a table, layer comment, or report. Use
[REDACTED-<type>]. - No weaponization. Atomic Red Team output is test names, GUIDs, platforms, and executor type only. Do not write exploit code, payloads, or step-by-step attack commands. Emulation plans reference test IDs and are for authorized scope only.
- Use the most specific sub-technique the evidence supports; otherwise the parent.
- Enterprise content that says "Defense Evasion" or "14 tactics" is pre-v19: migrate it (workflow E).
- If you cannot fetch the site, say so, mark every ID "unverified", and do not present the output as checked.
0. Look things up (always first)
Current version: fetch https://attack.mitre.org/resources/versions/ and read the current release.
Object pages (sub-techniques use a slash, T1059.001 -> /techniques/T1059/001/):
| Object | URL |
|---|---|
| Technique / sub-technique (all domains) | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/<T####>/ or /techniques/<T####>/<###>/ |
| Tactic | https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/<TA####>/ |
| Group | https://attack.mitre.org/groups/<G####>/ |
| Software | https://attack.mitre.org/software/<S####>/ |
| Campaign | https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/<C####>/ |
| Mitigation | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/<M####>/ |
| Detection strategy | https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/<DET####>/ |
| Data component | https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/<DC####>/ |
| Asset (ICS) | https://attack.mitre.org/assets/<A####>/ |
| All techniques in a domain | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/enterprise/ (also /mobile/, /ics/) |
| Changelogs | https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/ |
How to read the result:
- Revoked: the page is only a redirect stub (
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url=/techniques/T1685/005"/>). The ID is revoked; the URL in the stub is its replacement. Fetch the replacement and use it. Example:T1070.001->T1685.005. - Unknown: the page returns 404 or "Page Not Found". The ID does not exist; never output it.
- Deprecated: the page says the object is deprecated. Do not map to it.
- A live technique page lists its tactics, platforms, sub-techniques, procedure examples (groups, software and campaigns that use it), mitigations, and detection strategies.
To find an ID from words (for example "Cozy Bear"), use web search restricted to site:attack.mitre.org, then fetch the page to confirm.
Validate a finished draft
Before sending any deliverable:
- List every distinct ID in the draft (
TA####,T####(.###),G####,S####,C####,M####,DET####,DC####,A####). - Fetch each page (step 0). Record: OK, revoked (with replacement), deprecated, or unknown.
- For each technique, check the tactic you wrote is one of the tactics on its page, and the name matches the page.
- Fix every finding, then add a line to the deliverable:
Validated against attack.mitre.org (ATT&CK v<version>) on <date>: <n> IDs, all current.
For more than about 40 IDs, say that a full check is slow by web fetch and offer the CLI from the full plugin instead.
1. ID formats
| Prefix | Object | STIX type |
|---|---|---|
| TA#### | Tactic | x-mitre-tactic |
| T#### / T####.### | Technique / sub-technique | attack-pattern |
| G#### | Group | intrusion-set |
| S#### | Software | malware / tool |
| C#### | Campaign | campaign |
| M#### | Mitigation | course-of-action |
| DET#### | Detection strategy | x-mitre-detection-strategy |
| AN#### | Analytic | x-mitre-analytic |
| DC#### | Data component | x-mitre-data-component |
| A#### | Asset (ICS) | x-mitre-asset |
ICS techniques are T08xx/T09xx; mobile and enterprise share the T1xxx range, and groups/software can exist in several domains. Analytics (AN####) are shown on their detection strategy's page.
2. Current structure (v20.1)
Enterprise: 15 tactics (since v19)
| ID | Tactic | Shortname |
|---|---|---|
| TA0043 | Reconnaissance | reconnaissance |
| TA0042 | Resource Development | resource-development |
| TA0001 | Initial Access | initial-access |
| TA0002 | Execution | execution |
| TA0003 | Persistence | persistence |
| TA0004 | Privilege Escalation | privilege-escalation |
| TA0005 | Stealth (was Defense Evasion, same ID) | stealth |
| TA0112 | Defense Impairment (new in v19) | defense-impairment |
| TA0006 | Credential Access | credential-access |
| TA0007 | Discovery | discovery |
| TA0008 | Lateral Movement | lateral-movement |
| TA0009 | Collection | collection |
| TA0011 | Command and Control | command-and-control |
| TA0010 | Exfiltration | exfiltration |
| TA0040 | Impact | impact |
Platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux, ESXi, IaaS, Network Devices, PRE, Office Suite, SaaS, Identity Provider, Containers.
Mobile: 12 tactics (Android, iOS)
Initial Access TA0027, Execution TA0041, Persistence TA0028, Privilege Escalation TA0029, Defense Evasion TA0030 (the Stealth split was Enterprise only), Credential Access TA0031, Discovery TA0032, Lateral Movement TA0033, Collection TA0035, Command and Control TA0037, Exfiltration TA0036, Impact TA0034.
ICS: 12 tactics
Initial Access TA0108, Execution TA0104, Persistence TA0110, Privilege Escalation TA0111, Evasion TA0103, Discovery TA0102, Lateral Movement TA0109, Collection TA0100, Command and Control TA0101, Inhibit Response Function TA0107, Impair Process Control TA0106, Impact TA0105. ICS also has 18 assets (A####).
Counts, v20.1 (active objects)
| Domain | Techniques | Subs | Groups | Software | Campaigns | Mitigations | DET | AN | DC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | 227 | 479 | 178 | 842 | 57 | 44 | 706 | 1773 | 106 |
| Mobile | 78 | 47 | 20 | 129 | 3 | 13 | 125 | 213 | 29 |
| ICS | 78 | 26 | 14 | 25 | 10 | 53 | 104 | 300 | 40 |
3. Recent changes you must know (all verified in data)
v18 (Oct 2025): detection model rebuilt. Data sources were replaced by Detection Strategies (DET) -> Analytics (AN, platform-specific logic with tunables) -> Data Components (DC, with log source name and channel). One DET per technique.
v19 (2026-04-28): Defense Evasion split (Enterprise only).
- TA0005 renamed Stealth (hiding: masquerading, obfuscation, hide artifacts, indicator removal).
- New TA0112 Defense Impairment (breaking defenses), 57 techniques incl. subs. 60 existing techniques had their tactic list changed.
- 23 new techniques, 17 revoked. Replacement map (
revoked-by):
| Revoked | Replacement |
|---|---|
| T1562 Impair Defenses, T1562.001, T1562.006 | T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
| T1562.002 / .008 / .011 / .012 | T1685.001 Windows Event Log / T1685.002 Cloud Log / T1685.003 Modify or Spoof Tool UI / T1685.004 Linux Audit System Log |
| T1070.001 / T1070.002 (log clearing) | T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs / T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs |
| T1562.004 / .007 / .013 | T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall / T1686.001 Cloud Firewall / T1686.002 Network Device Firewall (T1686.003 Windows Host Firewall is new) |
| T1562.009 / T1562.010 / T1562.003 | T1688 Safe Mode Boot / T1689 Downgrade Attack / T1690 Prevent Command History Logging |
| T1656 Impersonation / T1672 Email Spoofing | T1684.001 Impersonation / T1684.002 Email Spoofing (under new T1684 Social Engineering, tactic Stealth) |
- Also new in v19: T1687 Exploitation for Defense Impairment, T1682 Query Public AI Services, T1683 Generate Content (.001 Written, .002 Audio-Visual), T1027.018 Invisible Unicode. T1211 renamed Exploitation for Stealth.
- Test for each behavior: is the actor hiding (Stealth) or breaking a defense (Defense Impairment)?
v19.2 (2026-08-05): first Agile release (groups/software/campaigns).
v20 (2026-10-13): AI-related techniques. T1699 Direct Prompt Injection and T1698 Indirect Prompt Injection (Execution), T1700 AI-Enabled Exfiltration (Exfiltration), T1608.007 Stage Capabilities: AI Result Poisoning (Resource Development), T1685.007 Disable or Modify Tools: Impair Autonomous Defenses (Defense Impairment), T1696 Anti-Automation Evasion with .001 Automate CAPTCHA Completion and .002 Avoid CAPTCHA (Stealth), T1697 Steal Application Specific Passwords (Credential Access). Also present: T1588.007 Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence. No technique revocations between v19.1 and v20.1. Use MITRE ATLAS alongside ATT&CK for attacks on AI systems themselves.
4. Workflows
A. Map a report or incident
- List each observed behavior as one sentence: actor did X, with Y, on platform Z. Keep the evidence quote and source location. Redact secrets and PII now.
- For each behavior pick the tactic by the actor's goal at that step (table in section 5), then find the technique: search
site:attack.mitre.org <verb + object>, fetch the technique page and compare its description. - Choose the most specific sub-technique the evidence supports. Assign confidence.
- Write the table (template in section 9). Validate the draft (section 0); fix every finding.
- Optional: write a Navigator layer (section D).
B. Detection coverage and gaps
- Get the detection list as rows
technique_id,detection_name,status, status one ofnone|logs|rule|tested. From Sigma rules, read theattack.tXXXXtags. Validate every ID (section 0). - Score each technique: none 0, logs 1, rule 2, tested 3. A parent takes its best sub-technique's score; a sub never inherits from its parent. Report per-tactic coverage (techniques with rule or better, divided by techniques in that tactic on the domain's techniques page).
- Rank gaps by relevance: fetch the pages of the groups that matter to the user and prefer techniques that several of them use.
- For each top gap, read its detection strategy page: compare the data components and log sources to what is actually collected. Missing log source means status stays
none; collected but no rule meanslogs. - Report with the coverage template. Say plainly that coverage % measures mapped rules, not detection quality.
C. Threat-informed emulation plan
- Fetch the group (or campaign) page: techniques used, software, campaigns. Fetch key software pages for tooling-driven techniques.
- Order techniques by tactic flow. For Atomic Red Team tests, fetch
https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/<T####>/<T####>.md(sub-techniques keep the dot, e.g.T1059.001) and pick tests by platform; note test names and GUIDs only. - For each step list expected telemetry (data component and log source from the detection strategy page) and the detection that should fire.
- Check the CTID Adversary Emulation Library for an existing plan for that actor. Use the emulation template.
D. Navigator layers
Write the layer JSON yourself in format 4.5, with one entry per tactic the technique belongs to (from its page) and validated IDs only:
{
"name": "<layer name>",
"versions": { "attack": "20", "navigator": "5.3.2", "layer": "4.5" },
"domain": "enterprise-attack",
"description": "<scope, source, date>",
"techniques": [
{
"techniqueID": "T1059.001",
"tactic": "execution",
"score": 1,
"comment": "<evidence>",
"enabled": true,
"showSubtechniques": false
}
],
"gradient": {
"colors": ["#ffffffff", "#66b1ffff"],
"minValue": 0,
"maxValue": 3
},
"legendItems": [],
"metadata": [],
"showTacticRowBackground": false,
"selectTechniquesAcrossTactics": true,
"selectSubtechniquesWithParent": false
}
tactic is the shortname from section 2; domain is enterprise-attack, mobile-attack or ics-attack; versions.attack is the major version you read in step 0. The user opens it at https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/ -> Open Existing Layer. For a group overlap, score each technique by how many of the groups use it.
E. Migrate pre-v19 or older content
- Validate the old content (section 0): replace each revoked ID with the replacement from its redirect stub. Fix tactic labels and technique names from the pages.
- Every Enterprise "Defense Evasion" label: look up the technique's current tactic, which is Stealth or Defense Impairment (or both).
- For release notes, use the changelogs at
https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/. - Record old and new ATT&CK versions in the deliverable.
5. Mapping methodology (CISA "Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping" style)
Order of work: find the behavior -> research it -> identify the tactic (why) -> identify the technique (how) -> identify the sub-technique -> peer check. Map behaviors, not indicators: an IP address or hash is not a technique.
| Actor goal at this step | Tactic |
|---|---|
| Learn about the target before access | Reconnaissance |
| Build or buy infrastructure, accounts, tools | Resource Development |
| Get in | Initial Access |
| Run code | Execution |
| Keep access across restarts or credential changes | Persistence |
| Get higher permissions | Privilege Escalation |
| Avoid being noticed | Stealth |
| Disable, break, or blind a security control or log | Defense Impairment |
| Steal credentials or tokens | Credential Access |
| Learn the environment after access | Discovery |
| Move to other systems | Lateral Movement |
| Gather target data | Collection |
| Talk to compromised systems | Command and Control |
| Take data out | Exfiltration |
| Destroy, encrypt, disrupt, manipulate | Impact |
Confidence levels:
- High: direct evidence of the behavior (command line, log event, malware analysis) matches the technique description.
- Medium: behavior is clear but the sub-technique or tactic is inferred from context.
- Low: inferred from an outcome or a tool's known capability; state the assumption.
Common mistakes:
- Mapping a tool's full capability list instead of what was observed in this incident.
- One technique per sentence by reflex: one behavior can need two mappings (e.g., a scheduled task is Execution and Persistence only if evidence shows both goals), and many sentences need none.
- Picking the tactic from the technique's first listed tactic instead of the actor's goal.
- Parent used when a sub fits, or a sub guessed when evidence only supports the parent.
- Confusing look-alikes: Valid Accounts (using creds) vs Brute Force (getting them); Exploit Public-Facing Application (initial access) vs Exploitation for Privilege Escalation; Ingress Tool Transfer vs Lateral Tool Transfer; Phishing vs Phishing for Information.
- Using revoked IDs or pre-v19 tactic names. Mixing domains (ICS T08xx in an Enterprise layer).
- Treating mitigations or CVEs as techniques.
6. Detection engineering
- Start from the technique's detection strategy page: each analytic gives platform, data components, log source names (e.g.,
WinEventLog:Sysmon,auditd:SYSCALL,AWS:CloudTrail), and a logic summary. A data component page lists every technique detectable from it: use it to justify onboarding a log source. - Analytics are behavioral descriptions, not ready rules. Translate to your SIEM, tune the listed mutable fields, test with an Atomic test, then mark
tested. - Tag rules at the most specific level; one rule may carry several techniques.
- Sigma tags: lowercase
attack.<tactic-shortname>andattack.t1059.001; alsoattack.g0016,attack.s0002. Checked 2026-11-14: sampled rules in SigmaHQ/sigma master already useattack.defense-impairmentwithattack.t1685/attack.t1685.005, and the Atomic Red Team index usesstealthanddefense-impairment. The Sigma tags appendix (v2.1.0, 2025-08-02) still listsdefense-evasion, so check the target repo's validators before bulk retagging. - Rate robustness, not only presence: CTID Summiting the Pyramid (Sigma
stp.*tags) scores how hard an analytic is to evade. - Coverage numbers overstate reality. Report rule count, tested count, and log source availability separately.
7. Threat intelligence
- Profile: the group page gives techniques (with procedure examples), software, and campaigns. Group pages lag current reporting; note the page's last-modified date and add recent vendor reporting with citations.
- Aliases are vendor-specific and overlap imperfectly. Say "tracked by MITRE as G0016 (APT29)" and keep vendor names as reported.
- Overlap: techniques used by several groups are common tradecraft worth detecting first. Shared techniques do not prove shared identity.
- Prioritize by: groups targeting the organization's sector and region, then techniques seen in recent campaigns (C####), then prevalence across those groups.
- Software-heavy actors (and most Mobile/ICS groups) need their software pages too to show real technique use.
8. Purple teaming and cross-framework links
| Resource | Use | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Atomic Red Team (redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) | Small per-technique tests | Enterprise only; already on v19+ IDs. Names and GUIDs only in outputs |
| MITRE Caldera (github.com/mitre/caldera) | Automated adversary emulation with ability-to-technique mapping | README now references apache/caldera; confirm current home |
| CTID Adversary Emulation Library (center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library) | Full and micro emulation plans per actor | Check which ATT&CK version each plan used |
| D3FEND (d3fend.mitre.org) | Defensive countermeasures mapped to ATT&CK techniques | Use for "what control counters this" |
| MITRE Engage (engage.mitre.org) | Adversary engagement, deception, and denial activities | Pair with emulation and detection plans |
| ATLAS (atlas.mitre.org) | Attacks on AI/ML systems | Pair with T1698-T1700, T1608.007, T1685.007 |
| CAPEC / CWE | Attack patterns and weaknesses | Some techniques carry CAPEC references |
| CTID Mappings Explorer (ctid.mitre.org/mappings) | NIST 800-53, cloud platform controls, CVE and KEV to ATT&CK | Each mapping set is pinned to an ATT&CK version: check it, then validate the IDs |
| CISA KEV catalog | Exploited CVEs for prioritizing T1190 / T1203 / T1068-type gaps | Map CVE -> technique via Mappings Explorer, not by guess |
| Mitigations (M####) | Listed on each technique page; a mitigation page lists the techniques it covers | Link to NIST 800-53 through Mappings Explorer |
Purple team loop: pick techniques from the gap list -> select Atomic tests -> run in authorized scope -> record which detection fired -> update the detection list status to tested -> regenerate the layer.
9. Output templates
Incident / report mapping (header line: "ATT&CK Enterprise v20.1, mapped , source ")
| # | Time (UTC) | Evidence (redacted quote + source) | Tactic | Technique ID | Technique name | Confidence | Notes |
|---|
Follow with: unmapped behaviors and why, assumptions, and the validation line from section 0.
Coverage report
- Scope: ATT&CK version, domain, platforms, rule sources, date.
- Summary: techniques with rule or better (n of N), tested (n), by-tactic table.
- Top gaps table: Technique | Tactic | Groups using | Required data components | Log source present? | Recommended action | Owner.
- Tag hygiene issues (revoked IDs, legacy tactics). 5. Navigator layer file. 6. Limits: coverage is not efficacy.
Emulation plan
- Objective, authorized scope, rules of engagement, ATT&CK version, actor (G####/C####) with sources.
- Step table: # | Tactic | Technique ID and name | Test reference (Atomic GUID or Caldera ability) | Platform | Expected telemetry (DC / log source) | Expected detection | Result.
- Safety: test accounts and hosts only, cleanup steps, stop conditions. 4. Findings feed back into the detection list.
Sources
- ATT&CK website: https://attack.mitre.org (versions: /resources/versions/, changelogs: /resources/updates/)
- Data: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data
- Navigator: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator (layers/spec/v4.5/layerformat.md)
- Sigma tags: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma-specification (specification/sigma-appendix-tags.md)
- Atomic Red Team: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
- CISA mapping guide: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/best-practices-mitre-attckr-mapping