UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills

Auditing guard gaps: the unguarded peer is the bug

Most access-control and missing-validation bugs aren't exotic - they're one handler in a family that forgot the check its siblings perform. The admin_delete that checks a role and the bulk_delete that doesn't. The read_bounded that validates length and the read_fast that trusts it. Reading files top-to-bottom hides these; comparing peers surfaces them. This is one of the highest-yield whitebox moves.

The asymmetry you're hunting

guard  →  sink     (the intended, safe path)
  ???  →  sink     (a peer path with the guard missing - the bug)

When to use

• A sink is reachable from several call sites and you suspect one skips a check.
• You're auditing an authz model, a parser family, or a handler group for a forgotten check.
• A finding needs its "why is this wrong" framed as a concrete diff against a correct peer.

Scope check

Authorized source only. If you can't name the authorization, stop.

The loop

1. Pick a guarded anchor. Find a function that does validate before a sensitive sink - an authz/ownership check, a bounds check, an allowlist, a sanitizer. This is your reference for "what correct looks like here."

2. Pin the guard to the sink it protects. Name the exact check and the exact sink. "Correct" means the guard dominates the sink: on every path through the anchor, the check runs before the sink. Mere presence in the function is not domination.

3. Enumerate the structural peers. Widen past same-file neighbors - the point is structural kinship: functions that reach the same sink; overrides of the same interface/virtual method; handlers in the same route table / dispatch map / command switch; parallel members of a class (get_x/set_x/delete_x); callers of a shared helper where some sanitize the argument and some pass it raw. Peers that reach the same sink are the strongest signal.

4. Diff each peer against the anchor - by what the guard enforces, not its name. For every peer, ask whether an equivalent check dominates the same sink. Classify the gap:

   • absent - no equivalent check at all.
   • bypassable - present but skippable on some path (early return, a short-circuiting ||, a branch that jumps the check).
   • weaker-than-peer - a different kind of check: authentication where the anchor does authorization; a type check where the anchor does bounds; one field where the anchor checks the sibling field too.
   • after-sink - the check runs, but after the dangerous operation.
   • wrong-context - a real check that doesn't cover this sink's payload class (an encoder that's wrong for the sink's language).

5. Confirm reachability with attacker input. An unguarded sink is only a bug if untrusted input reaches it. Trace the peer's dangerous argument back to a real source (hand to adjudicating-taint-paths). A peer only ever called with constants is not a finding.

6. Record as a diff - in the schema. State it as: "anchor A guards sink S with check C (dominating); peer B reaches S with guard_status = <absent / bypassable / weaker-than-peer / after-sink / wrong-context>, and B's argument is attacker-controlled via ." Emit per the finding schema.

Worked example

Anchor: delete_own_post(user, post_id) - checks post.owner == user.id (dominates) before db.delete(post). Peer: admin_bulk_delete(ids) reaches the same db.delete sink; the only gate is a route-level @login_required, no per-object ownership check. Diff: guard_status = weaker-than-peer - authentication present, authorization (ownership) absent. Reachability: ids comes straight from the request body; any authenticated user hits it. Confirmed IDOR/BFLA, severity high - "any logged-in user deletes any user's posts by id."

Rationalizations to reject

• "There's a check in the function, so it's guarded." → Only if it dominates the sink. A check on a branch the sink skips is no guard.
• "Both functions have auth, they're equivalent." → Authentication is not authorization; a type check is not a bounds check. Compare what's enforced.
• "The peer looks unguarded - report it." → Not until you confirm attacker input reaches the sink. Unreachable ≠ finding.
• "Same-file neighbors only." → The dangerous peer often lives in another module reaching the same sink. Enumerate by structure, not by file.

Executing this in practice

You need tooling that can group functions by the sink they reach and show the exact body of each, so you can diff guard-for-guard and check domination. A code property graph makes "which peers reach this sink, and which validate first" directly answerable; otherwise enumerate peers by hand from the call sites of the shared sink or helper and read each. The reachability step reuses adjudicating-taint-paths.

Related

• adjudicating-taint-paths - confirm the peer's sink is reachable with input.
• hunting-bugs-with-a-code-graph - the master loop this feeds.
• FINDING-SCHEMA.md - the shape every finding takes.